"What Should Banks Do? A Minskyan Analysis" by L. Randall Wray






WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? 
A MINSKYAN ANALYSIS
l. randall wrayThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is an autonomous research organization. It is nonpartisan, open to the
examination of diverse points of view, and dedicated to public service.
The Institute is publishing this research with the conviction that it is a constructive and positive contribution to discussions and debates on
relevant policy issues. Neither the Institute’s Board of Governors nor its advisers necessarily endorse any proposal made by the author.
The Institute believes in the potential for the study of economics to improve the human condition. Through scholarship and research it gen-
erates viable, effective public policy responses to important economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in the United States
and abroad.
The present research agenda includes such issues as financial instability, poverty, employment, gender, problems associated with the distribu-
tion of income and wealth, and international trade and competitiveness. In all its endeavors, the Institute places heavy emphasis on the val-
ues of personal freedom and justice.
Editor: Barbara Ross
Text Editor: Cynthia Werthamer
The Public Policy Brief Series is a publication of the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Blithewood, PO Box 5000, Annandale-on-
Hudson, NY 12504-5000. 
For information about the Levy Institute, call 845-758-7700 or 202-887-8464 (in Washington, D.C.), e-mail info@levy.org, or visit
www.levyinstitute.org.
The Public Policy Brief Series is produced by the Bard Publications Office.
Copyright © 2010 by the Levy Economics Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information-retrieval system, without permis-





4 What Should Banks Do?
L. Randall Wray
19 About the Author
ContentsLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 3
Preface
In this new brief, Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray examines the
later works of Hyman P. Minsky, with a focus on Minsky’s gen-
eral approach to financial institutions and policy. Minsky insisted
that the proper role of the financial system was to create a finan-
cial structure conducive to economic development that would
improve living standards. 
According to Minsky, a capitalist economy can be described as
a set of interrelated balance sheets and income statements. All eco-
nomic units—households, firms, financial institutions, and gov-
ernments—take asset positions by issuing liabilities with margins
of safety related to income, net worth, and liquidity. In terms of
financial institutions, he distinguished between traditional com-
mercial banking, investment banking, universal banking, and pub-
lic holding company models. Commercial banks can “force” a
surplus in order to generate gross capital income (profits plus inter-
est), and promote capital development by financing the wage bill of
workers in the investment-goods sector. An investment bank pro-
vides the external finance needed to place capital goods into the
hands of the entrepreneur or market. A universal bank combines
commercial and investment banking functions (both short-term
lending and long-term funding), while a public holding company
owns various types of financial firms that are separated by firewalls.  
The layering of financial commitments on top of income-
producing real assets created a new kind of capitalism, one in
which ownership positions need to be continually validated. That
phase of capitalism—what Minsky called “finance capitalism”—
imploded in the Great Depression. The government was too
small to offset the collapse of gross capital income that followed
the Great Crash of 1929. After World War II,a new stage of cap-
italism emerged—managerial welfare-state capitalism—with a
government so large that its deficit could expand sufficiently in a
downturn to offset the swing of investment. In addition, we had an
array of New Deal reforms that strengthened the financial system,
separating investment banks from commercial banks and putting
in place government guarantees such as deposit insurance. 
But, as Minsky observed, stability is destabilizing: the rela-
tively high rate of economic growth, plus the relative stability of
the financial system, encouraged innovations that, over time,
subverted the New Deal constraints. Financial wealth (and pri-
vate debt) grew on trend, producing immense sums of money
under professional management. Minsky called this stage, where
we are today, the “money manager” phase of capitalism. Here,
the real problem is the erosion of underwriting standards, com-
bined with the government’s endorsement of private obligations.
The investment banks are like huge hedge funds, but now with
bank charters giving them access to the Fed’s discount window
and to FDIC insurance. The demise of commercial banking and
simultaneous rise of shadow banking was largely a consequence
of this transition to money manager capitalism.
In Minsky’s view, deregulation was secondary to market fac-
tors in transforming the financial sector. With help from the gov-
ernment, power was consolidated in a handful of huge firms that
provided the four main financial services: commercial banking,
payments services, investment banking, and mortgages. Brokers
didn’t have a fiduciary responsibility to act in their clients’ best
interests, while financial institutions bet against households,
firms, and governments. By the early 2000s, says Wray, banking
had strayed far from the (Minskyan) notion that it should pro-
mote “capital development” of the economy.
Minsky insisted that banking reforms account for acceler-
ated innovation in both financial intermediation (i.e., relation-
ship banking) and the payments mechanism. He advocated
government policies to support a network of small community
development banks that would provide a full range of services.
Policy should also move to make the payments system a profit
center, so that banks can compete with money funds. And open-
ing the discount window to provide an elastic supply of reserve
funding, to a broad spectrum of financial institutions, would
ensure that banks could finance positions in as many assets as
they desired, at the target funds rate. If the Fed had lent reserves
without limit when the crisis hit, says Wray, it is probable that the
liquidity crisis could have been resolved more quickly. 
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
September 2010Public Policy Brief, No. 115 4
Introduction
Before we can reform the financial system, we need to under-
stand what banks do;or, better, what banks should do. This brief
examines the later work of Hyman Minsky at the Levy Institute
on his project titled “Reconstituting the United States’ Financial
Structure.” This led to a number of Levy working papers and also
to a draft book manuscript that was incomplete at the time of
Minsky’s death in 1996. Much of this work was devoted to his
thoughts on the role that banks do play and should play in the
economy. To put it as succinctly as possible, Minsky always
insisted that the proper role of the financial system is to promote
the “capital development” of the economy. By this he did not
simply mean that banks should finance investment in physical
capital. Rather, he was concerned with creating a financial struc-
ture that would be conducive to economic development to
improve living standards, broadly defined.
In many of his writings associated with this project,Minsky
emphasized six main points: (1) a capitalist economy is a finan-
cial system; (2) neoclassical economics is not useful because it
denies that the financial system matters; (3) the financial struc-
ture has become much more fragile;(4) this fragility makes stag-
nation or even a deep depression possible; (5) a stagnant
capitalist economy will not promote capital development; (6)
however, a stagnant capitalist economy can be avoided by apt
reform of the financial structure in conjunction with apt use of
the government’s fiscal powers.
Central to his argument is the understanding of banking
that Minsky developed over his career. Just as the financial sys-
tem changed (and with it, the capitalist economy), Minsky’s
views evolved. In this brief I focus on his papers and manuscripts
from 1992 to 1996 and his last major contribution, his Veblen-
Commons Award–winning paper on the institutional structure
of capitalist economies (Minsky 1996). I focus on Minsky’s over-
all approach to financial institutions and policy and his general
recommendations; I do not provide specific suggestions for pol-
icy reform.
What Do Banks Do?
According to Minsky (1992a, 12), “A capitalist economy can be
described by a set of interrelated balance sheets and income state-
ments.” The assets on a balance sheet are either financial or real,
held to yield income or to be sold or pledged. The liabilities rep-
resent a prior commitment to make payments on demand, on a
specified date, or when some contingency occurs. Assets and lia-
bilities are denominated in the money of account, and the excess
of the value of assets over the value of liabilities is counted as
nominal net worth. All economic units—households, firms,
financial institutions, governments—take positions in assets by
issuing liabilities, with margins of safety maintained for protec-
tion. One such margin is the excess of expected asset income
above the payment commitments entailed in the liabilities.
Another is net worth: for a given expected income stream, the
greater the value of assets relative to liabilities, the greater the
margin of safety. And still another is the liquidity of the posi-
tion: if assets can be sold quickly or pledged as collateral in a
loan, the margin of safety is bigger. (Of course, in the aggregate,
all financial assets and liabilities net to zero, with only real assets
representing aggregate net worth.) These three types of safety
margins are individually important. They are also complemen-
tary: one is not a substitute for another.
If the time duration of assets exceeds that of liabilities for
any unit, then positions must be continually refinanced. This
requires “the normal functioning of various markets, including
dependable fall-back markets in case the usual refinancing chan-
nels break down or become ‘too’ expensive” (Minsky 1992a, 14).
If disruption occurs, economic units that require continual
access to refinancing will try to “make position” by “selling out
position”—that is, selling assets to meet cash commitments.
Since assets and liabilities net to zero, the dynamic of a general-
ized sell-off is to drive asset prices toward zero, what Irving Fisher
called a debt deflation process. Specialist financial institutions
can try to protect markets by standing ready to purchase or lend
against assets, preventing prices from falling. However, they will
be overwhelmed by a contagion, and thus close up shop and
refuse to provide finance. For this reason, central bank interven-
tions are required to protect at least some financial institutions
by temporarily providing finance through lender-of-last-resort
facilities. As the creator of the high-powered money, only the
government—the central bank plus the treasury—can purchase
or lend against assets without limit, providing an infinitely elas-
tic supply of high-powered funds.
These general statements are applicable to all kinds of eco-
nomic units—which is what Minsky meant by saying that any
unit could be analyzed as if it were a “bank,” taking positions 
by issuing debt. Financial institutions are special in that they
operate with very high leverage ratios: for every dollar of assets,
they might issue 95 cents of liabilities; their positions in assetsLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
really are“financed” positions. Further, some kinds of financial
institutions specialize in taking positions in longer-term finan-
cial assets while issuing short-term liabilities—that is, they inten-
tionally put themselves in the position of continually requiring
refinancing. An extreme example would be an early 1980s–era
thrift institution that holds 30-year fixed-rate mortgages while
issuing demand deposits. Such an institution requires continual
access to refinancing on favorable terms because the interest rate
it earns is fixed,and because it cannot easily sell assets. This can
be described as an illiquid position that requires access to a source
of liquidity—either a Federal Home Loan Bank or the Fed. 
Still other kinds of financial institutions specialize in arrang-
ing finance by placing equities or debt into portfolios using mar-
kets. They typically rely on fee rather than interest income. In
normal circumstances, they do not hold these assets directly;
however, if markets become disorderly, they can get stuck with
assets they cannot sell (at prices they have promised), and thus
need access to financing of their inventories of stocks and bonds.
Some might hold and trade assets for their own account, earn-
ing income and capital gains, or they might do so for clients.
Among these various types of financial institutions, Minsky
distinguished between traditional commercial banking, invest-
ment banking, universal banking, and the public holding com-
pany model. A traditional commercial bank makes only
short-term loans that are collateralized by goods in production
and distribution. The loans are made good as soon as the goods
are sold—this is the model supporters of the “real bills”doctrine
had in mind (Minsky 1992c). The bank’s position is financed
through the issue of short-term liabilities such as demand and
savings deposits (or, in the 19th century, banknotes). The con-
nection among the bank, the “money supply,”and real produc-
tion is close—the sort of relation the quantity theory of money
supposed. Essentially, the firm borrows to pay wages and pur-
chase raw materials, with the bank advancing demand deposits
received by workers and suppliers. When the finished goods are
sold, firms are able to repay their loans. Banks charge higher
interest on loans than they pay on deposits, with the net interest
margin supplying bank profits. 
After World War II, banks commonly charged fees for man-
aging deposits—this helped fund the payments system. However,
innovation and competition with shadow banks forced interest
payments on deposit accounts, reducing bank profits, as banks
not only had to pay interest on their liabilities but also had to
operate a costly payments system. This helps to explain the high
leverage ratio of banking: to keep the differential between loan
and deposit rates low,the bank needs a high asset-to-capital ratio
in order to earn an acceptable profit rate on owner’s equity.
Alternatively, banks would need to make the payments system a
profitable operation, charging fees for deposit accounts and pay-
ments. However, if viable alternatives exist—such as cash or
checkable deposits at shadow banks—there will be limits to banks’
ability to squeeze a profit from the payments system. High bank
leverage is the trade-off for keeping interest rate differentials low.
If deposits are to maintain parity (with one another and
with cash), losses on assets must be very small, since a commer-
cial bank’s equity must absorb all asset value reductions. The
commercial banker’s duty is to be skeptical; Minsky loved to
repeat the banker’s cliché,“I’ve never seen a pro forma I didn’t
like.” In other words, borrowers will always present a favorable
view of their prospects—which is why careful underwriting is
essential. While it is true that loans can be made against collat-
eral (e.g., the goods in the process of production and distribu-
tion), a successful bank would almost never be forced to take the
collateral. A bank should not operate like a pawnshop. As Martin
Mayer (2010) points out, banking has always been a business
where profits come over time, as borrowers pay principal and
interest. He alludes to the morality of a loan officer, whose suc-
cess depends on the success of the borrower. It goes without say-
ing that betting on the failure of one’s borrower is inimical to the
duties of a commercial bank.
Minsky made a subtle but very important point regarding
the ability of the commercial bank to “force” a surplus, whence
comes gross capital income (profits plus interest). If we take the
simplest economy, the commercial bank finances the total wage
bill by extending loans and creating deposits. Only a portion of
the wages will be paid to workers producing goods for the con-
sumer market—what we can call wage goods. The other portion
is paid to workers producing investment goods—workers who
will spend their income on wage goods. The producers of wage
goods will thus receive gross profits equal to the wages paid in the
investment goods sector. While it appears to any single firm that
its profits are attributable to entrepreneurial finesse (good man-
agement and marketing, market power, productivity of its labor
and capital, and so on), this can only determine the distribution
of profits among firms. If investment goods are not produced,
there will be no aggregate profits (since one firm’s profits are
equal to the losses of other firms). In conditions of depressed
expectations of future profitability, investment collapses and soPublic Policy Brief, No. 115 6
does aggregate profit, because workers in the investment sector
will lose their jobs.
The banker holds the key—he is the “ephor of capitalism,”
as Minsky’s original dissertation adviser, Josef Schumpeter, put
it—because not only do entrepreneurs have to be sufficiently
optimistic to invest, they must also find a banker willing to
advance the wage bill to produce investment output. Note that
this ability to force a surplus (and to accumulate capital) is sep-
arate from the issue of financing ownership of capital goods. As
mentioned above, the fundamental purpose of a financial sys-
tem is to support the capital development of the economy. By
financing the wage bill of workers in the investment goods sec-
tor, commercial banks are promoting the capital development
of the economy, even if they do not actually provide finance for
position taking in investment goods. Hence, we can separate the
issue of producing capital goods from ownership of them. For
Schumpeter, and for Minsky, the “ephor of capitalism” breaks the
circuit of production and consumption of wage goods, in which
banks simply finance the production of consumer goods by
workers whose consumption exactly exhausts the wage bill
required to produce those goods. In other words, the ephor
allows the generation of profits by financing the spending of
those not directly involved in producing the goods. These prof-
its are “saved” in the form of accumulated capital goods. 
In the pre-1870 period that Minsky called the “commercial
capitalism”stage, investment goods were owned directly by indi-
vidual entrepreneurs and purchased out of accumulated savings
(from profits). In the next stage, “finance capitalism,” capital
goods had become too expensive for individual ownership, so
the corporate form emerged. External finance in the form of
shares and bonds financed the ownership of capital assets. This
led to the second type of bank, the investment bank. The func-
tion of an investment bank is to provide the external finance
needed to put the produced capital goods into the hands of the
entrepreneur. Using our simple model, the investment bank
intermediates between recipients of the financial surplus created
in production (by the spending of workers in the investment sec-
tor) and the entrepreneur who wishes to hold the produced cap-
ital goods. Note that while this is often framed as an intermediation
between “savers and investors,” it should not be interpreted as “sav-
ing finances investment”: the saving (out of profits) is actually cre-
ated by the production of the investment goods and the subsequent
consumption by workers from the investment sector. In other
words, this is about financing ownership, not production, of the
capital goods. Of course, the production of investment goods
does not normally occur unless it is fairly certain that they will
be sold; capital goods are typically produced on order for an
entrepreneur who has already obtained a commitment from an
investment bank to provide finance once the goods are ready.
For illustrative purposes, we can distinguish between two
investment banking models. In the first, the investment bank
holds the equities and bonds issued by the corporation that
requires financing of its capital stock. The investment bank in
turn finances its position by issuing debt and shares held by
households. If the investment bank’s debt is shorter term than
the assets it holds, it must be able to refinance its position as dis-
cussed above. Mayer’s aphorism still applies: the investment bank
will be successful only to the extent that its corporate borrowers
are successful. Alternatively, the investment bank simply places
the debt and equity of corporations into household portfolios.
This model of investment banking does not require borrower
success; rather than asking whether the borrower will repay the
loan, this investment banker only worries whether she can sell
the stocks and bonds she needs to place. Underwriting is no
longer an essential activity—indeed, careful underwriting can be
ensured only if the households that purchase the debt and equity
marketed by the investment bank have recourse. 
Of course, investment banks can combine both models, by
owning only the equities and bonds that households do not wish
to hold. Today in the United States, households for the most part
hold the bonds and equity of firms only indirectly, through pro-
fessionally managed funds: 
Most households that own wealth own it in the form
of interests in funds, mutual, pension, money market,
trust, and insurance reserves, and these funds are the
major holder of the liabilities of the largest companies.
As a result of the vast accumulations in these funds a
new type of financial capitalism has emerged. The man-
agers of such funds are mainly interested in what has
been called total returns, which are short-term returns
of dividends and the change in the values in the market
of the securities. The various manias, from conglomer-
ation to leveraged buyouts, that have swept capitalism
in the past years have reflected the power of these funds.
Let us call the 1990s version of the capital market/
commercial bank financial structure money manager
capitalism. (Minsky 1992c, 37–38)Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
(We will return to Minsky’s concept of money manager capital-
ism below.) 
This second investment bank model is often referred to as a
“markets” model as opposed to a “banks” model because it
largely relies on investment banks’ selling corporate debt to
households and fund managers. The best example is the devel-
opment of the asset-backed securities markets, in which origi-
nating banks (of a wide variety) package loans (again, of a wide
variety) to serve as the collateral behind marketed securities.
Initially, the idea was that originating banks would shift the risks
off their balance sheets, but they ended up retaining interests in
a lot of the securities—again,a point we will return to.
Minsky (1992c) analyzed two alternative arrangements to
the commercial-bank-plus-investment-bank model. The first is
the universal bank model that was adopted in Germany and
Japan; the second is the public holding company (PHC) model.
A universal bank model combines commercial and investment
banking functions in a bank that provides both short-term lend-
ing and long-term funding of the operation of firms. It issues
liabilities, including demand deposits, to households and buys
the stocks and bonds of firms. A universal bank might also pro-
vide a variety of other financial services, including mortgage
lending, retail brokering, and insurance. The other alternative is
the PHC model, whereby the holding company owns various
types of financial firms with some degree of separation provided
by firewalls. The PHC holds stocks and bonds of firms, and
finances positions by borrowing from banks, the market, and the
Treasury. Minsky argued that the development of money man-
ager capitalism led to a convergence of these three models. This
prescient recognition,in 1992,helps to explain the current crisis,
in which problems with mortgages first brought down invest-
ment banks and then the short-term lending market (such as
commercial paper) that bank holding companies had relied
upon for financing their positions in assets—including collater-
alized debt obligations held by “special purpose vehicle” (SPV)
subsidiaries.
Note how investment banking separates the proximate own-
ers of the real capital assets (the corporation) from the ultimate
owners (the investment bank in the first model, or households in
the second). In fact, things can quickly become very complicated,
with a “complex combination of equity shares, bonds, mortgages,
leases and bank loans” that “finance the control of the capital
assets that are needed for production” (Minsky 1992c, 32).All of
the liabilities of the corporation are assets of other economic
units, entailing “dated, demand, or contingent claims to the cash
flows that the operations of the unit, operations that depend
upon the use of the physical assets, generate.” Today’s produc-
tion of investment goods creates the profits that validate yester-
day’s decision to invest. Since today’s financing of the ownership
of positions in capital assets sets up a stream of commitments to
pay over a series of tomorrows, the positions taken today will not
be validated if production of investment goods does not take
place in those tomorrows. “This intertemporal nature of the
financial relations of a capitalist economy,” Minsky wrote,“is the
essential reason why capitalist economies are likely not to behave
in a nice equilibrium-seeking way and why markets need to be
regulated and controlled.” 
The layering of financial commitments on top of real assets
that generate income creates a new kind of capitalism, one in
which ownership positions need to be continually validated. This
new capitalism is in sharp contrast to the commercial capitalism
stage, where capital assets are owned outright so that an occa-
sional failure to generate gross capital income does not threaten
the entrepreneur’s existence. As we shall see, the finance capital-
ism stage is quite different, since a shortfall of gross profits sets
in motion behaviors that not only threaten the individual firm,
but can also threaten the entire system with debt deflation
dynamics.
According to Minsky, that phase of capitalism—what he
called (after Rudolf Hilferding) “finance capitalism”—imploded
in the Great Depression. The government was too small to offset
the collapse of gross capital income that followed the Great Crash
of 1929. After World War II,we emerged with a new stage of cap-
italism—managerial welfare-state capitalism—with a govern-
ment so large that its deficit could expand sufficiently in a
downturn to offset the swing of investment. This maintained the
aggregate surplus, allowing debts to be serviced. In addition, an
array of New Deal reforms had strengthened the financial sys-
tem, separating investment banks from commercial banks and
putting in place government guarantees such as deposit insur-
ance. But, as Minsky observed, stability is destabilizing. The rel-
atively high rate of economic growth, plus the relative stability 
of the financial system, over time encouraged innovations that
subverted the New Deal constraints. In addition, the financial
wealth (and private debt) grew on trend, producing huge sums
of money under professional management. Minsky called this
stage the “money manager”phase of capitalism. Public Policy Brief, No. 115 8
Banking in the Money Manager Phase of Capitalism
In an important sense, money manager capitalism represents a
return to the prewar finance capitalism stage. So let us first briefly
look at the condition of the financial system in 1929, on the
precipice of the Great Crash. Then we will look at the shift away
from paternalistic capitalism and toward money manager capi-
talism. In the subsequent section,we will examine in more detail
the condition of the financial system that collapsed in 2007.
As John Maynard Keynes (1936) famously described in his
General Theory, separation of nominal ownership (holders of
shares) from management of enterprise meant that prices of
equities would be influenced by “whirlpools” of optimism and
pessimism.1 Worse, as John Kenneth Galbraith (2009 [1954])
made clear, stocks could be manipulated by insiders—Wall
Street’s financial institutions—through a variety of “pump and
dump” schemes. Indeed, the 1929 crash resulted from excesses
promoted by investment trust subsidiaries of Wall Street’s banks.
Since the famous firms like Goldman Sachs were partnerships,
they did not issue stock; hence, they put together investment
trusts that would purport to hold valuable equities in other firms
(often in other affiliates, which sometimes held no stocks other
than those in Wall Street trusts) and then sell shares in these
trusts to a gullible public. 
Effectively, trusts were an early form of mutual fund, with
the “mother” investment house investing a small amount of cap-
ital in their offspring, highly leveraged using other people’s
money. Goldman and other firms would then whip up a specu-
lative fever in shares, reaping capital gains (Galbraith 2009
[1954]).Pyramid schemes are the worst example of what Minsky
called Ponzi finance; there was very little in the way of real pro-
duction or income associated with all this trading in paper.
Indeed, as Galbraith showed, the “real” economy was long past its
peak—there were no “fundamentals” to drive the Wall Street
boom. Inevitably, the economy collapsed and a debt deflation
began as everyone tried to sell out of their positions in stocks—
causing prices to collapse. Spending on the “real economy” suf-
fered, and we were off to the Great Depression. 
As described above, the “markets” type of investment bank
(which intermediates shares between the issuing corporation and
the household owners) opens up the possibility that underwrit-
ing will not be well done, since the risks are pushed off onto the
holders of corporate debt and equity. All of this will sound famil-
iar to anyone who has studied the dot-com, commodities, and
real estate bubbles of the past decade (see Wray 2008a, 2008b).
While many point to the demise of the Glass-Steagall separation
of banking by function, the problem was actually the demise of
underwriting. Arguably, all the recent financial crises in the
United States have resulted in large part from declining under-
writing standards. (Below we will visit Minsky’s views on the
Glass-Steagall Act.) 
The New Deal’s reaction to the Great Crash was to prohibit
commercial banks from handling equities—a reasonable
response to the excesses of the 1929 boom. The banking crisis
had been made very much worse by banks that were caught hold-
ing stocks with little or no value, many of them issued by invest-
ment trusts. Ironically, even the investment banks that had
created the trusts got burned:they also held the worthless stocks.
In some cases, this was because they got caught holding stocks
they were trying to sell when the market crashed. However, many
had invested in the pyramid schemes they created—following
the “greater fool”theory that they would recognize the peak and
sell out before the crash. Again, this will sound familiar to any-
one who has studied the 2007 crisis: the banks that originated
the toxic waste in the mid-2000s got caught holding it for pre-
cisely the same reasons. 
In other words, the problem and solution are not really
related to functional separation, but rather to the erosion of
underwriting standards that is inevitable over a run of good
times, and especially when a trader mentality triumphs. If a bank
believes it can offload questionable assets before values are
doubted, its incentive to do proper underwriting is reduced. And
if asset prices are generally rising on trend, the bank will try to
share in the gains by taking positions in the assets. This is why the
current calls by some to force banks to “put skin in the game” by
holding some fraction of the toxic waste they produce is wrong-
headed—banks will gladly increase “skin” in a speculative boom,
and get caught holding the trash. In the final section we will dis-
cuss some policies that could instead discipline underwriting
standards.
Minsky argued that the convergence of the various types of
banks under the umbrella of the bank holding company, and
within shadow banks,was fueled by the growth of money man-
ager capitalism. It was also encouraged by the expansion of the
government safety net, as Minsky remarked: “This convergence
is also reflected in the United States by a proliferation of gov-
ernment endorsements of private obligations” (Minsky 1992c,
39). Indeed, it is impossible to tell the story of the current crisis
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to the mortgage market through its government-sponsored
enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), through the student
loan market (Sallie Mae), and even through the “Greenspan Put”
and the Bernanke “Great Moderation,”all of which gave markets
the impression that the government would never let markets fail.
In the aftermath of the crisis, the government’s guarantee of
liabilities went far beyond FDIC-insured deposits and Fannie
and Freddie guarantees of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs)
to cover larger-denomination deposits as well as money market
funds, and the Fed extended lender-of-last-resort facilities to vir-
tually all financial institutions (with bailouts also going to auto
companies, and so on). This was a foregone conclusion once
Glass-Steagall was circumvented and then gutted, and invest-
ment banking, commercial banking, and all manner of financial
services were consolidated in a single financial “big box” super-
store with explicit government guarantees over a portion of the
liabilities. Financial institution indebtedness grew to some 120
percent of GDP—the leveraging and layering of national income
that Minsky addressed—with complex and unknowable linkages
among chartered banks and mostly unregulated institutions.
Clearly, if problems developed somewhere in a highly integrated
system, the Treasury and Fed would be on the hook to rescue the
shadow banks too. 
As late as the 1990s,the big investment banks were still part-
nerships,so they were unable to directly benefit from the run-up
of the stock market—a situation similar to 1929. An investment
bank could earn fees by arranging initial public offerings for
start-ups, and it could trade stocks for others or for its own
account. But in the irrational exuberance of the late 1990s, that
looked like small change. How could an investment bank get a
bigger share of the stock market action? In 1999 the largest part-
nerships went public in order to enjoy the advantages of issuing
stock in a boom. Top management was rewarded with stocks—
leading to the same “pump and dump”incentives that drove the
1929 boom. 
To be sure, traders like Robert Rubin (who would become
Treasury secretary under Clinton) had already come to dominate
firms like Goldman. Traders necessarily take a short view: you
are only as good as your last trade. More important, traders take
a zero-sum view of deals: there will be a winner and a loser, with
the investment bank pocketing fees for bringing the two sides
together. Better yet, the investment bank takes one of the two
sides—preferably the winning side—and pockets the fees and col-
lects the winnings. Before this transformation, trading profits
were a small part of investment bank revenues. For example,
before Goldman went public, only 28 percent of  its revenues
came from trading and investing activities. As of April 2010, that
figure had grown to about 80 percent. While many think of
Goldman and JPMorgan Chase (the investment banks remain-
ing after the demise of Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and
Merrill Lynch, all of which folded or were absorbed by other
firms) as banks, they are really more like huge hedge funds, albeit
very special ones that now hold bank charters, granted during
the crisis when investment banks were having trouble refinanc-
ing positions in assets—giving them access to the Fed’s discount
window and to FDIC insurance. That, in turn, lets them obtain
funding at near-zero interest rates. Indeed, in 2009 Goldman
spent only slightly more than $5 billion to borrow, versus $26
billion in interest expenses in 2008—a $21 billion subsidy thanks
to its access to cheap, government-insured, deposits. The two
remaining investment banks were also widely believed to be “back-
stopped” by the government—under no circumstances would
they be allowed to fail—keeping stock prices up (see Wray 2010).
In some ways, things were even worse than they had been
in 1929 because the investment banks had gone public, issuing
equities directly into the portfolios of households and indirectly
to households through the portfolios of managed money.
Therefore, Goldman or Merrill could not simply jettison one of
its unwanted offspring: problems with the stock or other liabil-
ities of the behemoth financial institutions would rattle Wall
Street and threaten the solvency of pension and other invested
funds. This finally became clear to the authorities after the prob-
lems with Bear and Lehman. The layering and linkages among
firms—made opaque by over-the-counter derivatives such as
credit default swaps (CDSs)—made it impossible to let them fail
one by one, as the failure of one would bring down the whole
house of cards. 
The problem was that total financial liabilities in the United
States rose to about five times GDP (versus 300 percent in 1929),
so that every dollar of income had to service five dollars of debt.
That is an average leverage ratio of five times income. That is one
(scary) way to measure leverage. For, as Minsky and Mayer
argued, a low leverage ratio is, historically, the important meas-
ure for bank profitability—which ultimately must be linked to
repayment of principle and interest out of income flows. 
Another measure, of course, is the ratio of debt to assets.
This became increasingly important during the real estate boom,
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more of the value of a mortgage, on the expectation that real
estate prices would rise. That is a trader’s, not a banker’s, per-
spective, since it relies on either sale of the asset or refinancing.
A traditional banker might feel safe with a capital leverage ratio
of 12 to 1, with careful underwriting to ensure that the borrower
would be able to make payments. With equity at risk, under-
writing is essential. 
However, for a mortgage originator or securitizer who has
no plans to hold the mortgage,what matters is the ability to place
the security. Many considerations then come into play, including
prospective asset price appreciation, credit ratings, monoline and
CDS “insurance,” and “overcollateralization” (markets for the
lower tranches of securities). We need not go deeply into the
details of these complex instruments. What is important is that
income flows take a backseat in such arrangements, and accept-
able capital leverage ratios are much higher. For money man-
agers, capital leverage ratios are 30 to 1, and reach up to several
hundred. But even these large numbers hide the reality that risk
exposures can be very much higher, since many commitments
are not reported on balance sheets. There are unknown and essen-
tially unquantifiable risks entailed in counterparties—for exam-
ple,in supposedly hedged CDSs in which one sells “insurance” on
suspected toxic waste and then offsets risks by buying “insurance”
that is only as good as the counterparty. Because balance sheets
are linked in highly complex and uncertain ways, the failure of
one counterparty can spread failures throughout the system. 
Ultimately, all of these financial instruments rest on the
shoulders of some homeowner trying to service her mortgage out
of income flows—on average,with five dollars’ worth of debt and
only one dollar of income to service them. As Minsky argued,
“National income and its distribution is the ‘rock’ upon which
the capitalist financial structure rests” (Minsky 1992d: III, 2).
Unfortunately, that rock is holding up a huge financial structure,
and the trend toward concentration of income and wealth at the
top makes it ever more difficult to support the weight of the debt.
In an ideal world, a lot of the debts will cancel, the home-
owner will not lose her job, and the FIRE (finance, insurance,
and real estate) sector can continue to force 40 percent of all cor-
porate profits in its direction. But that is not the world in which
we live. In our little slice of the blue planet, the homeowner
missed some payments, the securities issued against her mortgage
got downgraded, the monoline insurers went bust, the CDSs went
bad when AIG failed, the economy slowed and the homeowner
lost her job and then her house, real estate prices collapsed—and,
in spite of its best efforts to save money manager capitalism, the
federal government has not yet found a way out of the morass.
Banking on the Precipice: The Financial System That
Collapsed in 2007
Minsky’s writings in early 1992 addressed the banking crisis at
that time (which followed the 1980s S&L crisis), but most of his
points could be applied to the continuing evolution of the finan-
cial structure, which finally collapsed in 2007. He warned that
the financial conservativism of the early postwar years had given
way to money manager capitalism, which “ushered in a new era
of pervasive casino capitalism”—with the leveraged buyouts of
the late 1980s serving as a good example of the excesses (Minsky
1992d: II, 9). Much of that boom was driven by pension funds
“both as suppliers of the equity base for leveraged buy outs and
as the takers of the high yield bonds (junk bonds). . . . Systemic
overindebtedness may well be a legacy of pension funds in the
United States.” He argued that the decrease in the power of banks
and the concomitant rise of the power of managed money “has
little to do with the movement to deregulate banks and other
financial institutions.” Instead, he blamed the 1979–82 Volcker
experiment in monetarism that wiped out bank and thrift equity,
payments-system innovations (such as electronic funds transfers
and credit cards) that took away cheap deposit sources of bank
funds, and the “change in the international clout of the United
States” as far more important (Minsky 1992d: II, 12). Thus,
Minsky attributed the financial sector’s transformative shift away
from banking and toward managed money, which occurred over
a long period,to complex, and mostly endogenous, factors. While
deregulation (in the early 1980s, and then again in the late 1990s,
after Minsky’s death) played a role, Minsky insisted that this was
of secondary importance.
On the eve of the 2007 crash, we no longer had any sharp
distinction between investment banking and commercial bank-
ing—and repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 eliminated any
remaining barriers. Bank holding companies could engage in
business across the spectrum of financial activities. Some activities
were farmed out to independent or quasi-independent specialists
(independent mortgage brokers, SPVs). Many financial services
were supposedly removed from financial institutions, to be per-
formed by “markets.” However, this shift was more apparent than
real, since the dominant financial institutions controlled those
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and proprietary models). This is probably what Minsky meant
when he said that money manager capitalism had integrated the
various bank models. For our purposes, a handful of financial
behemoths provided the four main financial services: commer-
cial banking (short-term finance for business and government),
payments (for households, firms, and government), investment
banking (long-term finance for firms and government), and
mortgages (residential and commercial real estate). A lot of the
debts were securitized and ultimately held in pension, university
endowment, and sovereign wealth funds. (Note that,if anything,
the biggest institutions have consolidated their power in the
aftermath of the crisis, largely with government help.)
The originate-to-distribute model virtually eliminated
underwriting, to be replaced by a combination of property valu-
ation by assessors who were paid to overvalue real estate, by credit
ratings agencies who were paid to overrate securities, by account-
ants who were paid to ignore problems, and by monoline insur-
ers whose promises were not backed by sufficient loss reserves. As
Jan Kregel (2008) has argued, the mortgages were Ponzi schemes
from the very beginning: they required rising real estate prices as
well as continual access to refinance because borrowers did not
have the capacity to service the loans. Much of the activity was
actually off the balance sheets of banks and thrifts, with mort-
gage brokers arranging for finance, investment banks packaging
the securities, and the shadow banks, or managed money, hold-
ing the securities. While Fannie and Freddie have been subjected
to much ridicule, in truth neither of them made or arranged any
of the mortgages, and they only began to purchase toxic securi-
ties because they were all that markets were selling. 
When delinquencies and defaults on mortgages rose, prob-
lems immediately came back to the banks along several avenues:
they were stuck with securities they were trying to sell, they had
sold credit default “insurance” or had provided “buy-back” guar-
antees on securities they had sold, they had SPVs with loads of
bad assets, and they could not refinance their positions because
the market for short-term debt had practically disappeared. But
this was only the beginning of the financial sector’s problems.
Shenanigans similar to those that occurred in 1929 became wide-
spread in the past decade, as traders adopted the “greater fool”
theory: though certain the whole thing would inevitably collapse,
each trader thought he could sell out position at the peak, shunt-
ing toxic assets off to the less savvy. Just as in 1929, traders found
that selling into a collapsing market meant losses, and falling
asset prices meant collateral calls with no access to finance. 
We are very far indeed from Martin Mayer’s vision of bank-
ing, or Hyman Minsky’s concept of banks that finance the capi-
tal development of the economy. In the following section we
return to Minsky’s insights on banking, and try to identify what
banks should be doing in our new millennium. The previous dis-
cussion should make it pretty clear that banking as practiced in
the millennium’s first decade has gone seriously astray.
WhatShouldBanks Do?
First, let’s enumerate the essential functions to be provided by the
financial system: (1) a safe and sound payments system; (2) short-
term loans to households and firms and, possibly, to state and local
government; (3) a safe and sound housing finance system; (4) a
range of financial services including insurance, brokerage, and
retirement savings services; and (5) long-term funding of posi-
tions in expensive capital assets.
Obviously, no single institution should provide all of these
services, although the long-run trend has been to consolidate a
wide range of services within the affiliates of a bank holding
company. The New Deal reforms of the 1930s had separated
institutions by function (and state laws against branching pro-
vided geographic constraints). Minsky recognized that Glass-
Steagall had already become anachronistic by the early 1990s. He
insisted that any new reforms must take into account the accel-
erated innovations in both financial intermediation and the pay-
ments mechanism. As discussed above, he believed these changes
were largely market driven, and not due to deregulation. The
demise of commercial banking and the rise of shadow banking
were largely a consequence of the transition to money manager
capitalism.
In the draft book manuscript he left uncompleted, Minsky
dealt in detail with a Treasury proposal for “modernizing” the
financial system. Briefly, this document made recommendations
for “safer, more competitive banks,” by “strengthening” deposit
insurance, weakening Glass-Steagall and state limits on branch-
ing, allowing corporations to own banks, and consolidating reg-
ulatory supervision in the Treasury at the expense of reducing
the role of the Fed. Minsky argued that the proposal was at best
superficial because it ignored shadow banks. While he quibbled
with the approach taken to rescue the FDIC (recall that many
thrifts had failed and even the largest banks were in trouble in
the early 1990s), he agreed that deposit insurance had to be
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limits on branching were an attempt to “fix something that is not
broke,”because small-to medium-sized banks are more profitable
and relation oriented. In other words, there was no reason to
allow or promote the rise of hegemonic financial institutions with
national (or international) markets and broad scope. As many
others have long argued, the economies of scale associated with
banking are achieved at the size of relatively small banks. 
Minsky was not swayed by the Treasury’s argument that
banks were becoming uncompetitive because they could not
branch across state lines or because certain practices were pro-
hibited to them. He believed that repealing these constraints
would simply reduce the profitability of the smaller, relation-
oriented banks. However,he did recognize that the smaller banks
would lose market share, anyway, due to competition from
shadow banks. Hence, the solution would not be found in pro-
moting bigger, less profitable banks that are not interested in
relation-oriented banking. Rather, Minsky would allow greater
scope to the activities of the small community banks—a defense
against encroachment by shadow banks. We might call this
“intensifying” banking—allowing each small institution to pro-
vide a greater range of services—as opposed to promoting
branching and concentration of power in the hands of a few large
bank holding companies with a variety of subsidiaries.
In his proposal for development of the newly independent
Eastern European nations, Minsky argued that the critical prob-
lem was to “create a monetary and financial system which will
facilitate economic development, the emergence of democracy
and the integration with the capitalist world” (Minsky 1992c,
28).Except for the latter goal, this statement applies equally well
to promotion of capital development of the Western nations (see
also Minsky 1993). 
In Minsky’s view, capital development of the economy can be
“ill done”in two main ways: the “Smithian” and the “Keynesian.”
The first refers to what might be called “misallocation”: the wrong
investments are financed. The second refers to an insufficiency of
investment, which leads to a level of aggregate demand that is too
low to promote high employment. The 1980s suffered from both,
but mostly from inappropriate investment—especially in com-
mercial real estate investment. We could say that the 2000s again
suffered from ill-done, Smithian capital development, since far too
much finance flowed into the residential real estate sector. In both
cases, Minsky pointed the finger at securitization. In the 1980s,
the thrifts, which were not holding mortgages and had lowered
underwriting standards, had funding capacity that flowed into
commercial real estate; in the 2000s, the mania for risky (high-
return) asset-backed securities fueled subprime lending. In a dis-
cerning analysis, Minsky argued that 
Because of the way the mortgages were packaged it was
possible to sell off a package of mortgages at a premium
so that the originator and the investment banking firms
walked away from the deal with a net income and no
recourse from the holders. The instrument originators
and the security underwriters did not hazard any of
their wealth on the longer-term viability of the under-
lying projects. Obviously in such packaged financing
the selection and supervisory functions of lenders and
underwriters are not as well done as they might be
when the fortunes of the originators are at hazard over
the longer term. (Minsky 1992b, 22–23)
The implication is rather obvious: good underwriting is promoted
when the underwriter is exposed to the longer-term risks. This
brings us back to Minsky’s skeptical banker:
When we go to the theater we enter into a conspiracy
with the players to suspend disbelief. The financial
developments of the 1980s [and 1990s and 2000s!] can
be viewed as theater: promoters and portfolio managers
suspended disbelief with respect to where the cash
would come from that would [validate] the projects
being financed. Bankers, the designated sceptic in the
financial structure,placed their critical faculties on hold.
As a result the capital development was not done well.
Decentralization of finance may well be the way to rein-
troduce the necessary scepticism. (Minsky 1992a, 37) 
Decentralization plus maintaining exposure to risk could
reorient institutions back toward relationship banking.
Unfortunately, most trends in recent years have favored concen-
tration. The “too big to fail” doctrine that dates back to the prob-
lems of Continental Illinois in the early 1970s gives an obvious
advantage to the biggest banks. These are able to finance posi-
tions at the lowest cost because the government stands behind
them. Small local banks face higher costs as they try to attract
local deposits by opening more offices than necessary;it also costs
them more to attract “wholesale” deposits in national markets.
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risk), smaller banks pay more simply because of the market’s per-
ception that they are riskier (i.e., the government does not back-
stop them). As discussed, investment banks are now allowed to
operate like hedge funds, but they can obtain FDIC-insured
deposits and can rely on Fed and Treasury protection should risky
trades go bad. A small bank is very hard put to compete.
How can the system be reformed to favor relationship bank-
ing that seems to be more conducive to promoting the capital
development of the economy? First, it would be useful to reduce
government protections for less desirable banking activities. The
government currently provides two important kinds of protection:
liquidity and solvency. Liquidity is mostly provided by the Fed,
which lends reserves at the discount window and buys assets (in
the past, mostly government debt, but in recent years the Fed has
bought private debt as well). Refusing to provide liquidity is not
the right way to discipline the financial system. Minsky always
advocated extending discount window operations to include a wide
range of financial institutions. If the Fed had lent reserves without
limit to all financial institutions when the crisis first hit, the liquid-
ity crisis probably could have been resolved more quickly. Hence,
this kind of government protection should not be restrained. 
The second kind of protection,against default, is more prob-
lematic. Deposit insurance guarantees no default risk on certain
classes of deposits—now up to $250,000. This guarantee is essen-
tial for clearing at par and for maintaining a safe and secure pay-
ments system. There is no good reason to limit FDIC insurance to
$250,000, so the cap should be lifted. The question is which types
of institutions should be allowed to offer such deposits,or rather,
which types of assets would be eligible for financing using insured
deposits. Some considerations would include riskiness of assets,
maturity of assets, and whether purchase of the assets fulfills the
public purpose: the capital development of the economy. Risky
assets put the FDIC on the hook,since it must pay out dollar for
dollar;but if the FDIC resolves a failing institution,it will receive
only cents on each dollar of assets. In his discussion of the
Treasury’s proposal for rescuing the FDIC, Minsky made clear
that “cost to the Treasury” should not be a major concern
(another reason for removing the cap: it is not important to limit
the Treasury’s losses to the first $250,000 of a deposit). 
For the same reason, we can probably also conclude that
while riskiness of assets financed by issuing insured deposits
should be a concern, potential losses for the FDIC are not the
problem. Further, maturity of the assets is no longer a concern if
the Fed stands ready to lend reserves as needed; a bank could
always meet deposit withdrawals by borrowing reserves at the
discount window, so it would not need to sell longer-term assets.
Hence, the major argument for limiting the ability of financial
institutions to finance asset positions by issuing insured deposits
is that government has a legitimate interest in promoting the
public purpose. Banks should be prevented from issuing insured
deposits in a manner that causes the capital development of the
country to be “ill done.”
Banks that receive government protection in the form of liq-
uidity and (partial) solvency guarantees are essentially public-
private partnerships. They promote the public purpose by
specializing in activities that they can perform more competently
than the government can. One of these is underwriting: assess-
ing creditworthiness and building relations with borrowers that
enhance their willingness to repay. Over the past decade,a belief
that underwriting is unnecessary flowered and then collapsed.
Financial institutions discovered that credit rating scores could
not substitute for underwriting, in part because those scores can
be manipulated, but also because the elimination of relationship
banking changes the behavior of borrowers and lenders. This
means that past default rates become irrelevant to assessing risk
(as credit raters have discovered). If banks are not underwriting,
why would the government need them as partners? The govern-
ment could just finance directly activities that it perceives to be
in the public interest: home mortgages, student loans, state and
local government infrastructure, and even small-business activ-
ities (commercial real estate and working capital expenses).
Where underwriting is not seen to fulfill a public purpose, then
the government can simply cut out the middleman.
Indeed, there has been a movement in that direction, with the
government taking back control of student loans. When the gov-
ernment guarantees deposits as well as loans (e.g., mortgages and
student loans), the banks’role becomes merely to provide under-
writing. On the other hand, where underwriting iscritical—say, in
commercial lending—then the government needs the middle-
man to select those firms deserving of credit.
The problem banks have faced over the past three or four
decades is the “cream skimming” of their business by shadow
banks (or, as Minsky called it, managed money). Uninsured
checkable deposits in managed funds (such as money market
mutual funds) offered a higher-earning and relatively convenient
alternative to insured deposits, allowing much of the payments
system to bypass banks. As Minsky argued, credit cards also
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larger banks capture a lot of the credit card business). At the same
time, banks were squeezed on the other side of their balance
sheet by the development of the commercial paper market,
which allowed firms to borrow shortterm at interest rates below
those on bank loans (sometimes, firms could even borrow more
cheaply than banks could). Again, larger banks recaptured some
of that business by earning fees for guaranteeing commercial
paper (originally through a credit line, which did not necessarily
guarantee the creditworthiness of the issuing firm,but did com-
mit the bank to lending if the firm came to be seen as troubled). 
But these competitive pressures caused banks to jettison
expensive underwriting and relationship banking in favor of the
originate-to-distribute model. The incentives are mostly nega-
tive when it comes to bank guarantees against debt that is issued
without careful underwriting: banks earn fee income, so the
drive is to maximize revenue by maximizing throughput. While
it is true that the bank is on the hook if the backup provided by
the guarantee is triggered, those getting the fees today are not
necessarily incentivized to fully account for that risk. And given
the complex linkages, guarantees likely will be triggered at an
inconvenient time for the banks—precisely when everything is
going bad all at once. Therefore, guarantees and linkages grow
in good times that then look horrible in bad times.
There is no simple solution to these competitive pressures,
although Minsky offered some ideas. In several publications
Minsky argued that policy should move to make the payments
system a profit center for banks. “One weakness of the banking
system centers around the American scheme of paying for the
payments system by the differential between the return on assets
and the interest paid on deposits. In general the administration
of the checking system costs some 3.5% of the amount of
deposits subject to check. If the checking system were an inde-
pendent profit center for banks, then the banks would be in a
better position to compete with the money funds” (Minsky
1992a, 36). It is not desirable to try a return to the early postwar
period, when banks and thrifts monopolized the payments sys-
tem. However, in the 1800s, the federal government eliminated
private banknotes by placing a tax on them. In a similar manner,
transaction taxes could be placed on payments made through
managed funds, with preferential treatment of payments made
through banks to restore a competitive edge. In addition, banks
could be offered lower, subsidized, fees for use of the Fed’s clear-
ing system. Minsky (1992d) also held out some hope that by 
substituting debit cards for checks, banks could substantially
lower their costs of operating the payments system—something
that does seem to be happening.
Part of the problem today is that the Fed requires that a por-
tion of a bank’s funding come from retail deposits. As mentioned
above, Minsky believed this causes local banks to open more
offices than necessary in order to compete for retail deposits. Part
of the reason for the New Deal’s Regulation Q was precisely to
eliminate competition for such deposits, on the belief that it
raised the costs of such funds and induced banks to purchase
riskier assets to cover those costs. The biggest “brand name”
banks more easily attract retail deposits, and they also have the
advantage that they are perceived to be safer. For this reason,
Warren Mosler (2010) has called for the elimination of any
requirement that banks maintain a specified proportion of their
funding in the form of retail deposits. Taken along with Minsky’s
argument that banks should be able to borrow reserves on
demand at the Fed, this means thatthe banks’ cost of funds would
be the Fed’s overnight interest rate—plus any “frown costs.” 
Some, including Minsky’s Levy colleague Ronnie Phillips
(1995a, 1995b), have called for a return to the 100 percent money
proposal of Irving Fisher and Milton Friedman, whereby
deposit-issuing banks would be allowed to hold only Fed reserves
and Treasury debt as assets. Minsky argued that this proposal
loses sight of “the main object: the capital development of the
economy. The key role of banking is lending or, better, financing.
The questions to be asked of any financial system are what do
the assets of banks and other financial institutions represent, is
the capital development of the economy better served if the prox-
imate financiers are decentralized local institutions, and should
the stricture lean towards compartmentalized or broad jurisdic-
tion institutions” (Minsky 1992a, 36–37).To be sure, Minsky did
not categorically reject the narrow bank proposal (indeed, he
wrote a supportive note for the book by Phillips [1995b]). He
simply believed such a proposal addresses only a peripheral
problem: the safety and soundness of the payments and savings
systems. It does not directly address promotion of the capital
development of the economy.
Recall the dichotomy between the Smithian problem and
the Keynesian problem: banks might finance the wrong projects,
and they might not finance the right amount. Opening the dis-
count window to provide an elastic supply of reserve funding
ensures that banks canfinance positions in as many assets as they
desire at the Fed’s target rate. (As discussed above, the Fed would
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banks finance a portion of their asset positions using retail
deposits.) This does not guarantee that we have solved the
Keynesian problem, since banks might finance too much or too
little activity to achieve full employment. Offering banks unlim-
ited funding addresses only the liability side of banking; it leaves
the asset side open. It is somewhat easier to resolve the “too
much” part of the Keynesian problem; the Fed or other regula-
tors can simply impose constraints on bank purchases of assets
when banks are financing too much activity. For example, dur-
ing the recent real estate boom it was obvious (except, appar-
ently, to mainstream economists and to many at the Fed) that
lending should be curtailed. 
The problem is that the orthodox response to too much
lending is to raise the federal funds target rate. And because bor-
rowing is not very interest sensitive, especially in a euphoric
boom, rates must rise sharply to have much effect. Further, rais-
ing rates conflicts with the Fed’s goal of maintaining financial
stability, since—as the Volcker experiment showed—interest rate
hikes that are sufficiently large to kill a boom are also large
enough to cause severe financial disruption (something like
three-quarters of all thrifts were driven to insolvency during the
S&L crisis). In fact, Minsky argued that the early 1990s banking
crisis was in part due to the aftermath of the Volcker experiment
of a decade earlier. Indeed, this recognition is part of the reason
that the Greenspan/Bernanke Fed turned to “gradualism,” a series
of very small rate hikes that are well telegraphed. Unfortunately,
this means that markets have plenty of time to prepare and to
compensate for rate hikes, which means the hikes have less impact.
For these reasons, rate hikes are not an appropriate means of
controlling bank lending. Instead,the controls ought to be direct:
raising down payments and collateral requirements, and even
issuing cease-and-desist orders to prevent further financing of
some activities. For a while, imposing capital requirements was
seen as a proper way to regulate bank lending: higher capital
requirements not only make banks safer but also constrain bank
lending, unless the banks can raise capital. Unfortunately, nei-
ther claim was correct. Higher capital requirements were
imposed in the aftermath of the S&L fiasco, and codified in the
Basel agreements. Rather than constraining bank purchases of
assets, banks simply moved assets and liabilities off their balance
sheets—putting them into SPVs, for example. Basel also imposed
risk-adjusted weightings for capital requirements to encourage
banks to hold less risky assets,for which they were rewarded with
lower capital requirements. Unfortunately, banks gamed the sys-
tem in two ways: (1) since risk weightings were by class, banks
would take the riskiest positions in each class; and (2) banks
worked with credit ratings agencies to structure assets, such as
MBSs,to achieve the risk weighting desired. For example, banks
could get, relatively easily, triple-A-rated tranches (as safe as sov-
ereign government debt) out of packages of subprime and “liar
loan” Alt-A mortgages—with 85–90 percent of investment-grade
tranches made up of risky mortgages. 
Finally, Minsky (1986) argued that, all else being equal, high
capital ratios necessarily reduce the return on equity (and hence,
the growth of net worth), so it is not necessarily true that higher
capital ratios improve bank safety since they mean lower prof-
itability. Indeed, with higher capital ratios banks must select a
higher risk/return asset portfolio to achieve a targeted return on
equity (Tymoigne and Wray 2009). Again, if regulators want to
constrain the growth rate of lending, direct credit controls are
apparently better.
On the other hand, not much can be done to encourage
banks to lend when they do not want to. That is the old “you
can’t push on a string” argument, and it describes the current sit-
uation quite well. Government policy should not try to get banks
to make loans they do not want to make! After all, if banks are
our underwriters, and if their assessment is that there are no
good loans to be made, then we should trust their judgment. In
that case, lending is not the way to stimulate aggregate demand
to get the economy moving toward fuller employment. Instead,
fiscal policy is the way to do it.
Solving the Smithian problem requires direct oversight of
bank activity, mostly on the asset side of their balance sheet.
Financial activities that further the capital development of the
economy need to be encouraged; those that cause it to be “ill
done” need to be discouraged. One of the reasons that Minsky
wanted the Fed to lend reserves to all comers was so that private
institutions would be “in the bank”—that is, indebted to the Fed.
As a creditor, the Fed would be able to ask the banker the ques-
tion, How will you repay me? 
The Federal Reserve’s powers to examine are inherent in
its ability to lend to banks through the discount win-
dow. . . . As a lender to banks, either as the normal
provider of the reserve base to commercial banks (the
normal operation prior to the great depression) or as
the potential lender of last resort, central banks have a
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competence of their clients, banks and bank manage-
ments. This is no more than any bank believes it has the
right to know about its clients. (Minsky 1992d, 10) 
The Fed would ask to see evidence for the cash flow that would
enable the bank to service loans. It is common practice for a cen-
tral bank to lend against collateral, using a “haircut” to favor cer-
tain kinds of assets (e.g., a bank might be able to borrow 100
cents on the dollar against government debt but only 75 cents
against a dollar of mortgage debt). Collateral requirements and
haircuts can be used to discipline banks—to influence the kinds
of assets they purchase. 
Examination of a bank’s books also allows the Fed to look
for risky practices and keep abreast of developments. The Fed
was caught with its pants down, so to speak, by the crisis that
began in 2007, in part because it generally supplied reserves in
open market operations rather than at the discount window.
Forcing private banks “into the bank” gave the Fed more lever-
age over their activities. For this reason, Minsky opposed the
Treasury’s proposal to strip the Fed of some of its responsibility
for the regulation and oversight of institutions. If anything, he
would have increased the Fed’s role,and used the discount win-
dow as an important tool for oversight. 
Minsky’s views are relevant to current discussions about the
creation of a “super” systemic regulator, and he probably would
have sided with those who want to increase the Fed’s power.
Since “a central bank needs to have business, supervisory and
examination relations with banks and markets if it is to be
knowledgeable about what is happening,” he also believed that
reducing its responsibility for examining and supervising banks
would also inhibit its “ability to perform its monetary policy
function. This is so because monetary policy operations are con-
strained by the Federal Reserve’s views of the effect such opera-
tions would have upon bank activities and market stability”
(Minsky 1992d, 10). The Fed would be better informed to the
extent that it supervised and examined banks—leading, one
hopes, to better policy formation.
Minsky worried that the trend toward megabanks “may well
allow the weakest part of the system, the giant banks, to expand,
not because they are efficient but because they can use the clout of
their large asset base and cash flows to make life uncomfortable for
local banks: predatory pricing and corners [of the market] cannot
be ruled out in the American context” (Minsky 1992d, 12).Further,
since the size of loans depends on the capital base, big banks have
a natural affinity for the “big deals,” while small banks service
smaller clients: “A 1 billion dollar bank may well have 80 million
dollars in capital. It therefore would have an 8 to 12 million dollar
maximum line of credit. . . . [In the U.S.] context this means the
normal client for such banks is a community or smaller business:
such banks are small business development corporations” (ibid.).
For this reason, Minsky advocated a proactive government
policy to create and support small community development
banks (CDBs) (Minsky et al. 1993). Very briefly, the argument
advanced was that the capital development of the nation and of
communities is fostered via the provision of a broad range of
financial services. Unfortunately, many communities, lower-
income consumers, and smaller and start-up firms are inade-
quately provisioned with these services. For example, many
communities host far more check-cashing outlets and pawn-
shops than bank offices. Many households do not even have a
checking account. Small businesses often finance activities using
credit card debt. Hence, the proposal would have created a net-
work of small community development banks to provide a full
range of services (a sort of universal bank for underserved com-
munities): (1) a payment system for check cashing and clearing,
and for credit and debit cards; (2) secure depositories for savings
and transaction balances; (3) household financing for housing,
consumer debts, and student loans; (4) commercial banking serv-
ices for loans, payroll services, and advice; (5) investment banking
services for determining the appropriate liability structure for the
assets of a firm, and placing those liabilities; and (6) asset man-
agement and advice for households (Minsky et al. 1993, 10–11). 
The institutions would be kept small, local, and profitable.
They would be public-private partnerships, with a new Federal
Bank for Community Development Banks created to provide
equity and to charter and supervise the CDBs. Each CDB would
be organized as a bank holding company. Examples of its 
composition would be: a narrow bank to provide payments serv-
ices; a commercial bank to provide loans to firms and mortgages
to households; an investment bank to intermediate equity issues
and long-term debt of firms; and a trust bank to act as a trustee
and to provide financial advice.
Reform of the financial system does need to address the
“shadow banks” of money manager capitalism. Minsky believed
that pension funds were largely responsible for the leveraged-
buyout boom (and bust) of the 1980s; similarly, strong evidence
indicates that pension funds drove the commodities boom and
bust of the mid-2000s (Wray 2008b).To be sure,this is just a partLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
of managed money, but it is a government-protected-and-
supported portion—both because it gets favorable tax treatment
and because it has quasi-government backing through the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (Nersisyan and Wray 2010).Hence,
yet another public-private partnership ought to serve the public
purpose. Minsky wondered,“Should the power of pension funds
be attenuated by having open-ended IRAs? (No limit to contri-
butions, withdrawals without penalty but all withdrawals taxed,
interest and dividend accruals not taxed except as they are spent)”
(1992a, 35). The IRAs would compete with managed pension
funds, reducing their influence. Greater regulation of pension
funds—to ensure they serve the public purpose—is also required.
For example, there is no justification for letting pension funds
speculate in commodities, such as food and energy products. Nor
should pension funds be allowed to use CDSs to bet against firms,
households, or governments. The argument that such activities
are potentially profitable should hold no water—even if it were
true (and it is not: see Nersisyan and Wray 2010). As protected
and tax-supported funds, these should not be allowed to engage
in activities that run counter to the public purpose.
Finally, returning to Minsky’s views on the role that financial
institutions play in forcing and allocating a surplus, he would cer-
tainly be appalled at recent trends. First, an important shift has
taken place, away from wage share and toward gross capital
income. I will not go into all the implications of this, but stagnant
wages clearly played a part in promoting the growth of household
indebtedness over the past three decades, with rapid acceleration
since the mid-1990s. As many at the Levy Institute had been argu-
ing since 1996, the shift toward a private sector deficit that was
unprecedentedly large and persistent proved to be unsustainable.
The mountain of debt still crushing households is in part due to
the shift of national income away from wage income, as house-
holds try to maintain living standards through borrowing. 
Equally problematic is the allocation of profits toward the
financial sector. Just before the crisis broke, in late 2007, 40
percent of all corporate profits accrued to the FIRE sector, and its
share has returned to that level. This contrasts with a 10–15percent
share until the 1970s, and a 20 percent share until the 1990s. While
value added by the FIRE sector also grew, from about 12 percent in
the early postwar period to nearly 20 percent today, its share of
profits was twice as high as its share of value added by the time of
the 2000s bubble. Hence, we see three interrelated problems: the
surplus forced by the financial sector is probably too large (the wage
share is too small), the share of GDP coming from the financial
sector is probably too large, and the share of the surplus allocated
by the financial sector to itself is far too large. Downsizing finance
is necessary to ensure that the capital development of the economy
can be well done, not “ill done.”With 40percent of corporate prof-
its going to finance, too little is left to other sectors, which encour-
ages entrepreneurial effort and innovations to be directed (wrongly,
in the Smithian sense) toward the financial sector.
Conclusion
Over past decades,the belief that “markets work to promote the
public interest” gained in popularity. Minsky asked, But what if
they don’t? A system of constraints and interventions can work
better. He also believed that we need to make “industry” domi-
nate over “speculation” (recalling Keynes’s famous dichotomy),
and not vice versa, or the capital development of the economy
will be ill done in two ways: the Smithian/Neoclassical way or
the Keynes/Aggregate Demand way. If investment is misdirected,
we not only waste resources but also get boom and bust. If invest-
ment is too low, we not only suffer from unemployment but also
achieve profits too low to support commitments, leading to
default. Further, when profits are low in “industry,” problems
arise in the financial sector, since commitments cannot be met.
In that case, individual profit-seeking behavior leads to incoher-
ent results as financial markets, labor markets, and goods mar-
kets all react in a manner that causes wages and prices to fall,
generating a debt deflation. Unfortunately, things are not better
when investment is too high: it generates high profits that reward
innovation, generating greater risk taking and eventually pro-
ducing a financial structure that is too fragile. As Minsky always
argued, the really dangerous instability in a capitalist economy is
in the upward direction—toward a euphoric boom. That is what
makes a debt deflation possible, as asset prices become overval-
ued and too much unserviceable debt is issued.
The Smithian ideal is that debt deflations are not endoge-
nous; rather, they must result from exogenous factors, including
too much government regulation and intervention. So the solu-
tion is deregulation, downsizing government, tax cuts, and mak-
ing markets more flexible. The Keynesian view is that the financial
structure is transformed over a run of good times,from a robust
to a fragile state,as a result of the natural reaction of agents to the
successful operation of the economy. If policymakers understood
this, they could formulate policy to attenuate the transforma-
tion—and then to deal with a crisis when it occurs. Public Policy Brief, No. 115 18
Note
1. “The position becomes serious when enterprise becomes the
bubble on a whirlpool of speculation” (chap. 12, 159).
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